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2ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the extent to which firms adopt recommended but not required 
corporate governance guidelines and establish that firms voluntarily implement 
suggested domestic best practices and the mandatory practices of neighboring 
countries as well. Drawing on the intuition of a principal-agent model in which 
the entrepreneur cannot fund all positive NPV projects, we hypothesize that 
access to capital is a primary determinant of the willingness of firms to 
voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms. Our empirical results 
provide significant evidence that firms voluntarily adopt corporate governance 
guidelines. These results suggest that global competition for capital encourages 
firms to voluntarily adopt governance mechanisms that are attractive to both 
domestic and foreign investors. We provide some evidence that the integration 
of global capital markets may lead to convergence in governance standards 
across countries. 
3Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms: The Role of 
Domestic and International Governance Guidelines 
 
It is well-known that corporate governance practices vary significantly 
from country to country (Doidge et al, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; La Porta et 
al, 1998). While a country’s guidelines and standards provide a general 
framework for these practices, significant variation also occurs among individual 
firms within a country (Klein et al, 2004; Gompers et al, 2003).  This variability 
suggests that implementing governance practices is in part a voluntary choice. In 
fact, the laws of many countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia make explicit the voluntary nature of corporate governance.  Corporate 
governance law in these jurisdictions is two-tiered.  Like US corporate law, it 
consists at a first level of voluntary or enabling statutory provisions (Black, 1990).  
Yet unlike the US system, these countries also have in place a set of best practice 
guidelines. Firms are not required to implement these guidelines; they are only 
required to disclose which governance practices they have not implemented and 
explain why (the “comply and explain” system).  
 Unfortunately, we know very little about firms’ governance decisions 
under these voluntary regimes. Have firms implemented additional governance 
standards over time? What motivates some firms to adopt rigorous corporate 
governance guidelines in the absence of any legal requirement to do so while 
their country cohorts employ relatively lax standards? Do firms look beyond 
4their home-country borders when determining which governance standards to 
employ?  This paper seeks to answer these questions by examining firms’ 
governance practices under voluntary regimes. We examine the extent to which 
firms voluntarily adopt recommended but not required corporate governance 
practices. Having established that some level of voluntary adoption occurs, we 
then proceed to identify firm characteristics associated with this adoption.   
 The bulk of academic attention in corporate governance has been devoted 
to making predictions about the firm’s performance as a result of the governance 
practices it chooses (Coles, 2000; Jog and Dutta, 2004). For instance, Black, Jang 
and Kim (2005) demonstrate near causal relation between corporate governance 
and firm valuation in Korea.  Doidge, Karolyi and Stultz (2003) show that foreign 
firms with cross-listings are valued higher than their domestic peers. Unlike this 
literature, we analyze firms’ governance practices and relate these practices to 
particular characteristics of the firm.   We seek to answer the fundamental 
question of what determines a firm’s decision to adopt governance standards 
that are not mandatory in nature. Do certain firm characteristics impact the 
governance structure that the firm will adopt? 
 Durnev and Kim (2005) provide one of the few existing examinations of 
the influence of firm characteristics on the level of corporate governance 
practices.  They find that investment opportunities, external financing, and 
ownership structure are influential determinants of governance practices and 
that the strength of their influence depends in part on the country’s legal 
5environment.  While we will examine the influence of similar characteristics on a 
firm’s corporate governance, our study differs from theirs in two primary ways. 
First, we provide explicit evidence that firms voluntarily adopt governance 
practices over and above those required in corporate legislation and that the level 
of this adoption has been increasing over time.  Second, we show that it is not 
only the home country’s governance regime that influences the chosen level of 
governance but also the standards of neighboring countries, particularly the 
United States,  through which external financing may also be raised. As a result 
of this case study, we contribute to the debate on whether the globalization of 
financial markets leads to convergence in corporate governance practices across 
countries (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2004; Coffee, 1999; Berglof and von 
Thadden, 2000). 
 Our analysis relies on hand-collected governance data for Canadian firms. 
We turn to the Canadian market for two reasons: 1) the voluntary nature of its 
domestic governance guidelines and 2) the tendency for Canadian firms to raise 
capital in the Unites States. The voluntary nature of the Canadian guidelines 
between 1999 and 2003 provides us with a relatively long time period during 
which to examine whether firms alter their governance guidelines to align with 
recommended domestic standards in the absence of any legal requirement to do 
so.  We can then identify firm characteristics that were particularly powerful 
motivators in encouraging the adoption of these domestic standards.   
6The enactment of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 provides a 
second opportunity to examine the nature of voluntary governance. If 
competition for capital extends beyond domestic borders, then, Canadian firms 
may feel compelled to adopt SOX provisions in order to attract US investors. As 
a result, the relevant corporate governance guidelines are not only those in place 
under the Canadian legal regime but also extend much more broadly to 
incorporate foreign (US) guidelines as well. 
 Our empirical results suggest that recent years have seen an increase in 
the overall level of corporate governance mechanisms employed by Canadian 
firms. Firm characteristics that are associated with the adoption of the Canadian 
guidelines include the absence of a large executive block holding and a high need 
for external financing. When it comes to voluntarily adopting the SOX 
provisions, firm size becomes an important determinant. This is perhaps not 
surprising since it is the largest Canadian firms that may be most in need of 
attracting capital from foreign investors. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides an 
overview of the Canadian corporate governance guidelines in place over the 
sample period and discusses the incentives that firms may have for voluntarily 
adopting these guidelines. Section II provides a simple model outlining the 
mechanisms behind voluntary adoption and yields our primary hypothesis for 
the empirical tests. Section III discusses the construction of the dataset and 
7collection of measurement variables while Section IV presents the empirical 
results. Section V concludes with directions for our further research. 
 
I. An Overview of Governance Guidelines Relevant for Canadian 
Firms 
The Canadian governance regime is built largely on a “comply and 
explain” system (for comparisons with other legal regimes see Anand, 2006).  
The regime has been in place since 1995 when the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
issued a list of best practice guidelines that firms may adopt, but that they were 
not obliged to.4 The guidelines addressed the following issues: the board’s 
mandate; its independence and composition (including minority shareholder 
representation); the independence of board committees; board approval; 
procedures for recruiting new directors and assessing board performance; 
measures for receiving shareholder feedback; and the board’s expectations of 
management. 
 Added to the best practice guidelines was a disclosure requirement. 
Disclosure regarding the extent of a firm’s compliance with the best practices 
was required in a “Statement of Corporate Governance Practices” in the firm’s 
 
4 See Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, “Where Were the 
Directors?” Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada, Guideline (12)(i), (1994) [Dey 
Report]. The TSX adopted the Dey Report in February 1995 and on May 3, 1995, released TSE By-Law 
19.17, which requires companies incorporated in a Canadian jurisdiction and listed on the Exchange to 
make disclosure annually regarding their corporate governance practices in an annual report or information 
circular. These guidelines came into effect beginning with companies whose fiscal year ended on June 30, 
1995. See Guidelines, in Toronto Stock Exchange, TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 472 (2004). Section 474 lists 
the fourteen recommendations of the Dey Committee.  
8proxy circular or annual report.5 A listed company was obliged to make 
disclosure with reference to the guidelines and where its governance system 
differed from the guidelines, it was to explain the differences.6 In 2004, securities 
regulators implemented mandatory rules relating to audit committee 
composition and certification of financial disclosure.7 As a result, we restrict our 
analysis to the period of voluntary governance guidelines ending in 2003. 
 Since a large number of Canadian firms are listed on both Canadian and 
US stock exchanges, US corporate governance requirements are as relevant as 
Canadian guidelines for several firms. Most notable among these guidelines is of 
course the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which departs from the traditional voluntary 
structure in place in several countries8 and mandates firms, including cross-listed 
firms, to implement the Act’s provisions.  Thus, Canadian firms listed on US 
exchanges are required to comply with SOX as well as listing requirements of US 
exchanges.  As a result, it has been suggested that US corporate governance 
standards have become the de facto guidelines for Canadian firms. Even those 
firms that are currently not cross-listed in the US and therefore not mandated to 
comply with SOX or US listing requirements may feel significant pressure to 
 
5 See e.g. Guidelines, in Toronto Stock Exchange, TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 473 (2004) 
http://www.tse.com/en/pdf/CompanyManual.pdf [TSX Guidelines]. 
6 The TSX Company Manual, supra note 23 at § 473. Section 474 lists the fourteen 
recommendations of the Dey Committee.  
7 Multilateral Instrument 52-110: Audit Committees (2004), online: Ontario Securities Commission 
www.osc.gov.on.ca 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-110-audit-
comm.jsp>.  See also Multilateral Instrument 52-109: Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual and 
Interim Filings (2004), online: Ontario Securities Commission 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-109-cert.jsp>. 
8 For a useful discussion of voluntary corporate governance standards in the E.U. see de Jong et al (2005). 
9voluntarily comply if they believe that US investors view these provisions 
favorably.9 In other words, global competition for capital may be a strong 
incentive for non cross-listed Canadian firms to voluntarily adopt US governance 
mechanisms.  It is worth noting that SOX addresses a number of issues that are 
not duplicated in the Canadian corporate governance regime, including: 
prohibition on insider loans; disclosure of material-off balance sheet transactions 
(the corresponding Canadian rule is weaker); internal control procedures, and 
forfeiture of bonuses in the event of a restatement of a financial document that 
arises as a result of misconduct.  During the time period of this study (pre 2004), 
SOX further differed from Canadian requirements which did not contain 
financial certification and audit committee composition rules.  Additional 
differences arise under the listing rules of US exchanges.  For example, both the 
NYSE and NASDAQ require a majority of independent directors on the board 
and the compensation committee while these are only suggested practices in 
Canadian jurisdictions.  Thus, for Canadian firms that do not cross-list, 
compliance with SOX, US listing standards as well as the TSX guidelines is 
ultimately voluntary. 
II. Model and Hypothesis Development 
A) Model of Voluntary Adoption
9 Canadian companies are able to raise capital in the US without cross listing under the Multi-
Jurisdictional Disclosure System and through exemptions from registration for private offerings as is found 
in Regulation D/Section 4(2) and Rule 144A for example. 
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III.  Model and Hypothesis Development 
A) Model of Voluntary Adoption
There is an extensive theoretical literature discussing voluntary 
governance structures for firms (see Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2003 and Tirole, 
2001 for extended surveys). This literature makes clear that there does not exist a 
single model that encompasses the complexity of the governance of the modern 
firm and its interaction with associated agents and its market environment. In 
this section, we sketch the basic ideas for an informal model and the restricted 
use that we will make of it in our empirical study. We will see that this model is 
general enough to capture the intuition of our proposed hypotheses. 
 Consider a simple example, which is a standard, principal-agent model 
with moral hazard, where there are incentives for voluntary monitoring, 
stemming from market incentives (our exposition here follows closely that 
presented in Tirole, 2001). An inside management group can alter the probability 
of success of a random return on a project to make it less profitable. But this 
action allows management to receive a private benefit valued at B. Therefore 
management is tempted by the private return B, to alter their behavior (to 
misbehave) and invest in a project with a low net present value. In turn, outside 
investors (Tirole draws no distinction between equity and debt in this risk 
neutral world, but we assume that we are discussing outside equity) , 
understanding management’s incentives, will be wary of investing in a firm 
where management may misbehave and invest in a low net present value 
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project. In some cases, the firm may not be able to secure outside capital, even 
though the project has a positive net present value. This leads to an incentive for 
management to commit to credible control structures that will ensure that the 
high net present value project will be chosen. An example of such a credible 
structure is a governance structure that incorporates monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure that  management will not be tempted to misbehave.   
 We can see that management’s commitment to a credible governance 
structure may be important to investors for several reasons. First, investors will 
value the increased probability of high net present value projects that is 
associated with good behaviour and therefore be more willing to provide the 
necessary capital to invest in these projects. In addition, foreign investors may be 
attracted to companies complying with the guidelines of investor-friendly 
jurisdictions.10 
We will sketch the formal model of voluntary adoption, setting out the 
principal assumptions and equations and giving a brief summary of the key 
results. Assume there are three dates: at the first date the firm has some initial 
equity capital A, and decides whether to invest in a project that costs a larger 
amount I. That is, the firm must obtain an amount I-A  0 from outside investors. 
At the second date, management can choose to behave and the project will have 
a probability of success of pH , paying R, and zero otherwise. If management 
 
10 There is a large literature on the impact of legal jurisdictions on investment. La Porta et al (1998) 
document that legal regimes offering strong investor protection have larger capital markets (both debt and 
equity) and more initial public offerings. 
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misbehaves (and earns a private benefit B) then the probability of earning R falls 
to pL < pH . Define P = pH - pL > 0 as the decline in probability from 
misbehaving. Assume that the project has a positive net present value pH R – I >
0. Finally, at the third date, the investment pays a verifiable return R, or zero.  
 To ensure that investors are willing to lend to the firm, we require 
incentive compatibility constraints that will guarantee that management will not 
misbehave with the borrowed money. First, the risk neutral management must 
be compensated by an amount w M 0 to forgo the private benefit and choose the 
higher probability project. As a result, w must satisfy (pH - pL )w  B; that is, the 
benefits from choosing the better project must exceed the private reward from 
misbehaving. This implies that the outside investors are constrained in the good 
outcome to earn at most R – [ B / (pH - pL ) ] without violating management‘s 
incentives. 
 As a consequence, a necessary and sufficient condition for financing is 
that pH (R – [ B / (pH - pL ) ] )  I – A, or pH R – (I – A)  pH [ B / (pH - pL ) ]. That is 
the expected income for the good project must exceed the investor’s contribution. 
If we assume that there is a competitive investor market, then the inequality will 
be satisfied with equality in equilibrium, and management will receive the 
residual from their monopoly of inside information. 
 It is easy to show that if  pH R – I > 0 > pH (R – [ B / (pH - pL ) ] ) – (I – A), 
then a positive net present value project will not be funded. This is said to be a 
case of capital rationing. Notice that the amount of inside equity A has a positive 
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benefit in that it allows management to circumvent the necessity for large-scale 
capital raising. In the extreme case where I = A, then management can choose the 
good project, internalizing the loss of efficiency from taking the inferior project. 
Another obvious conclusion is that if management has a good reputation for 
integrity (we can think of this as being represented by B being small) then the 
firm is much more likely to be funded. Both of these factors (more inside equity 
and a good reputation) improve the ability of the firm to raise capital and invest 
in the project. 
 To allow for outside capital raising with different governance structures, 
we adapt Tirole’s model and particularly the allowance for costly active 
monitoring that improves management’s performance by reducing  
management’s incentive to misbehave. Assume that the standard financing 
constraint has basic governance costs and benefits built into the returns R and 
private benefits B. Assume that costly monitoring (eg. conforming to SOX) costs 
CA >0, and that the monitoring reduces the private benefit to b where b <B. Now 
management has a choice between the standard constraint  pH (R – [ B / (pH - pL )
] ) M (I – A) with no active monitoring; and pH (R – [ b / (pH - pL ) ] ) - CA M (I – A)
with active monitoring. Clearly there is a trade-off for management, when 
choosing the amount of governance, between the direct costs of monitoring and 
the indirect cost of improved incentives. This simple structure allows for 
endogenous choice of corporate governance structures.   
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 Our empirical hypothesis stems directly from the model as outlined 
above. We propose that management’s need for external capital and their ability 
to access it will influence their willingness to voluntarily adopt additional 
governance standards in order to appear attractive to external investors. In other 
words, maintaining a relatively high value of A, internal capital, reduces the 
manager’s dependence on external funding and therefore his or her motivation 
for adopting governance measures declines. We elaborate on how we proceed to 
test this hypothesis below. 
 
B) Relating Capital Access to Governance
We suggest that the extent to which a firm needs access to capital will be 
an important determinant of its corporate governance structure under a 
voluntary legal regime. The more the firm must access public equity markets, the 
more emphasis it may place on ensuring that adequate conditions are present to 
protect minority shareholders’ interests. Improving board quality as suggested 
by the Canadian guidelines is one way to signal a commitment to strong 
corporate governance and may allow the firm to raise capital at a lower cost if 
these measures are seen to reduce shareholder risk (Macey, 1998).  
 In order to identify a firm’s need for capital, we examine the company’s 
current capital expenditures, its retained earnings, and its research and 
development expenses (R&D). All three of these measures are scaled by total 
assets to control for differences in firm size. We suspect that the greater the need 
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for capital, as indicated by high capex, low retentions, or high R&D, the more 
willing the firm will be to voluntarily adopt additional governance standards. 
 To identify the firm’s ability to access alternative sources of capital, we 
control for its total leverage ratio, its market to book ratio, the tangibility of its 
assets and firm size as measured by total assets. We expect that firms with 
tangible assets that may be used for collateral and a low total leverage ratio may 
be better able to turn to debt for funds. Firms that turn to debt may not 
implement the same governance mechanisms since lenders often have the ability 
to request firm compliance with specific practices through covenants in the case 
of public debt or direct monitoring in the case of bank loans. Firms with high 
leverage and intangible assets may be more likely to raise funds through equity 
and therefore be more willing to voluntarily implement additional governance 
mechanisms. 
 The predictions for large firms and those with a high market to book ratio 
are harder to determine.  Our intuition suggests that large firms and those with a 
higher market to book ratio may find it easier to access capital markets.  A high 
market to book ratio implies that the current stock price is strong and may 
signify the premium that the market puts on a well-governed firm. Therefore 
management may find investors willing to accept a new stock issue. As a result, 
these firms may not need to improve board quality to the same extent to attract 
investors.  However, since a high market to book ratio makes an equity issue 
particularly appealing, management may want to implement strong governance 
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practices to further enhance investor protection and make the issue even more 
attractive to investors. As a result, the relationship between the market to book 
ratio and board quality is unclear. Similarly, large firms are more likely to need 
access to additional sources of capital, particularly in a relatively small domestic 
market like Canada. While overall it may be easier for a large firm to access 
equity markets than a small firm and therefore less necessary for larger firms to 
improve their governance, the sheer volume of financing that must be raised 
may still encourage large firms to voluntarily incorporate governance guidelines. 
 Several other firm characteristics beyond need for capital may influence a 
firm’s willingness to voluntarily adopt governance guidelines as we explain 
below. The actions of other firms in the industry, the presence of block 
shareholders, or overall time trends are all likely to be powerful influences. We 
include these conditions as controls and identify the variables used to proxy for 
them in the discussion of the dataset below. 
 
IV. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
A) Construction of the Dataset
In order to establish the propensity of Canadian firms to implement 
governance practices voluntarily, we hand-collected time-series data from the 
proxy circulars of a sample of firms. We chose to use proxy circulars since 
Canadian securities law specifies the type of information that should be 
disclosed in these documents unlike annual reports whose content is not 
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mandated by securities law. Proxy circulars, for instance, must provide a 
description of board members and their relation to the firm.  The firm must also 
disclose any shareholders who hold 10% or more of the firm’s voting shares. 
While Canadian governance guidelines recommend certain practices related to 
board quality such as training sessions for new board members and the 
separation of chair and CEO, these practices are not mandatory.  We can deduce 
from the proxy circulars whether or not the company has chosen to implement 
them.  
 The resulting dataset consists of a panel of companies listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange from 1999 to 2003.  We begin our examination in 1999 as 
this was the year in which the TSX attempted to clarify its requirements relating 
to firm disclosure of governance practices. 11 We examined proxy circulars for 
2003 but not beyond this year since by 2004 securities regulators had adopted 
two mandatory rules that mirrored two SOX provisions relating to audit 
committee composition and financial statement certification.  Thus, our data 
collection covers the time period between the request for formatted disclosure by 
the TSX (1999) and prior to the implementation of mandatory requirements that 
affected both non cross-listed and cross-listed firms (2003).   
 The companies chosen are those included in the S&P/TSX index (formerly 
the TSE300). Since many firms remain in the index for multiple years, the 
 
11 In 1999, the TSX stated that the disclosure should take a certain format. See letter from Clare 
Gaudet, Vice President Corporate Finance Services, Toronto Stock Exchange (Nov. 17, 1999) (on file with 
author).   
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resulting dataset contains 942 firm-year observations from a total of 338 different 
firms.  For each observation we collect information on the board of directors, 
large block holders of common shares, the existence of dual classes of common 
stock, and certain mechanisms explicitly related to SOX such as financial 
statement certification. 
 
B) Measures of Voluntary Adoption
We create two indices measuring the extent to which a firm voluntarily 
adopted the suggested Canadian guidelines and those practices mandated by 
SOX or US listing requirements.  The majority of the Canadian governance 
guidelines implemented by the TSX in 1995 relate to board composition. As a 
result, we begin our analysis with an assessment of board quality.  In this 
assessment we focus on four characteristics of boards that were suggested to be 
good practice by the Canadian guidelines. These characteristics include: 
separation of the CEO and board chair; a fully independent audit committee; a 
majority of independent directors; and the provision of training for new 
members. A firm-year observation is allocated a point for each of these 
guidelines that it follows up to a maximum of 4.  
 In the second part of our analysis, we examine whether a firm’s need for 
capital motivates it to voluntarily adopt governance guidelines that extend 
beyond its country’s borders. We focus only on non cross-listed Canadian firms 
(i.e. those not mandated to comply with SOX). We again create an index related 
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to corporate governance standards, this time incorporating requirements 
contained in SOX and listing standards from American exchanges.  In a small 
number of instances, the suggested Canadian guidelines overlap with the SOX 
practices. The US governance index has eight components with a firm receiving 
one point for each of the following standards that it has implemented: a financial 
expert on the audit committee, the ability of the board to hire advisors, an 
independent audit committee, an independent compensation committee, a code 
of ethics, financial certification, the elimination of internal loans to managers, and 
a majority of independent directors. A maximum of 8 points are possible. 
 
C) Evidence of Voluntary Adoption
Prior to examining the influence of firm characteristics on the willingness 
of firms to voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms, we provide 
evidence that a number of our sample firms do in fact implement governance 
practices in the absence of any legal requirement to do so. In their examination of 
voluntary guidelines in place in the Netherlands, de Jong et al (2005) find little 
evidence that firms heightened their governance practices in response to the 
country’s self-regulation initiative. Here, we make no causal claim that voluntary 
adoption is in response to the Canadian guidelines and in fact hypothesize 
explicitly that firms improve governance practices to enhance their corporate 
position. As a starting point, we seek to establish the extent to which Canadian 
firms voluntarily adopt both the Canadian and SOX governance standards. 
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 We begin by examining the index that concerns the voluntary adoption of 
Canadian guidelines. Since the majority of these guidelines refer to board quality 
we denote the index by BQ and recall that its maximum value is 4. Panel A of 
Table 1 provides values for the average level of the BQ index for each year of the 
sample. This average value is 2.78 in 1999 and increases monotonically to a value 
of 3.43 in 2003. The overall average across all years is 3.04. Univariate tests show 
that in each year from 1999 to 2003 and across all firm-year observations the 
average BQ value is significantly different from zero. In other words, a 
significant number of firms chose to implement some of the best practice 
guidelines suggested by the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
 Figure 1 plots the proportion of firms implementing each of the four 
suggested best practices that form the BQ index. We see that for each component, 
the proportion of firms complying with the guidelines has increased between 
1999 and 2003. This is perhaps most dramatic for the proportion of firms 
providing training for new board members and maintaining a fully independent 
audit committee. There has been much less of an increase in the proportion of 
firms with a majority of independent directors. However, it should be noted that 
the vast majority of firms (close to 90%) already maintained boards with this 
characteristic even in 1999. As a result, room for improvement was small.  
 Having established that firms’ boards reflect voluntary standards put in 
place by the Toronto Stock Exchange in the mid-90s, we turn to a second setting 
in which voluntary adoption may occur.  This setting is the implementation of 
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standards contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the listing rules of US stock 
exchanges. While Canadian firms with stocks cross-listed in the US must comply 
with SOX and listing rules, non cross-listed firms do not. We therefore focus on 
non cross-listed Canadian firms that are in no way obligated to comply with the 
US standards. 
 Recall that our second governance index (the SX index) consists of eight 
elements. We plot the values of the index across all firm-year observations in 
Figure 2. Values are plotted both for the entire sample of firms and only those 
that are not-cross-listed in the United States. For both groups, the most common 
value for the index is 5 out of 8.   
 We note that cross-listed firms in 2002 and 2003 did not all reach the 
maximum index value of 8 since many of the provisions of SOX and the listing 
standards were not required to be implemented by foreign firms by year-end 
fiscal 2003. While some did manage full compliance by 2003, we note that some 
non cross-listed firms also maintained index values of 8 during our sample 
period. As in the case of the Canadian standards, we see that firms frequently 
adopt additional governance practices in the absence of any formal requirement 
to do so. A formal test of whether the SOX index is equal to 0 for all non cross-
listed firm-year observations is easily rejected at the 1 percent level. 
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D) Control Variables
Our primary hypothesis is that a firm’s need for capital will motivate it to 
implement sound corporate governance practices appealing to both domestic 
and foreign investors. We are not so naïve however to believe that the need for 
capital is the only determinant of governance practices and in this section 
describe the variables that we will implement as controls while testing our 
hypothesis. These controls fall under 4 categories: year of observation, presence 
of large block holders, industry practice, and existence of multiple listings for the 
stock. Each will be described in turn. 
 Since our sample period covers a tumultuous time filled with corporate 
scandals, we control for the year to which our observation of a firm’s corporate 
governance relates. The increased awareness of corporate governance issues 
brought about by scandals in the early 2000s may have been enough to motivate 
firms to adopt additional governance mechanisms regardless of their need for 
capital. These firms may have foreseen the implementation of mandatory 
governance legislation or sought to resemble their peers that were also adopting 
heightened governance practices. As a result, we define the variable YR to be 
equal to 0 in 1999, 1 in 2000 etc. until reaching a maximum of 4 in 2003. As the 
average values for the BQ index have suggested, we anticipate that the YR 
variable will be positively related to the voluntary adoption of governance 
standards. 
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 A second firm characteristic that we expect to influence the voluntary 
adoption of corporate governance standards is the presence of a large block 
holder.  As noted, proxy circulars must disclose all individuals or groups holding 
over 10% of the voting power of common shares. We examine these block 
holders and classify them into one of three groups; families, executives, and 
other investors. Typically family block holdings are possessed by the original 
founding family of the firm (Morck et al, 2004) whereas we define executive 
block holdings to be holdings maintained by senior management members. If an 
executive is also a member of the family we consider his/her holdings to be part 
of the family block. The third group of block holders is neither family nor 
executives.  Instead they are typically large institutional investors such as 
pension or mutual funds. While families and executives with significant stock 
holdings may be less inclined to adopt  governance practices voluntarily, we 
suggest that the presence of large institutional investors may in fact encourage 
the adoption of additional governance mechanisms in keeping with their 
monitoring role, which has extensively been described elsewhere (see Black, 
1990).12 But we admit that the opposite hypothesis is equally plausible.  That is, 
once institutional investors own large stakes, they arguably require an 
appearance of compliance with governance guidelines less.  They can rely on 
 
12 In formulating this study, we met with representatives from the two largest institutional investors 
in Canada being the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan Board and the Ontario Municipal Employee Retirement 
System.  We also met with the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG)which is a group of 
institutions formed in 2002 to fight for improved governance in Canadian corporations.  Members of the 
CCGG hold in aggregate $135 billion of assets of Canadian corporations.  These bodies affirmed their 
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their share ownership to exercise leverage.  In other words, blockholding may be 
a substitute for governance, implying less compliance with the TSX guidelines. 
 An additional control variable related to block holdings is the presence of 
dual classes of shares.  One of the most contentious corporate governance issues 
in Canada is the existence of shares with differential voting power (dual class 
shares). These shares provide a significant amount of control to a small number 
of individuals at the expense of minority investors.  We identify whether firms in 
our sample maintain dual classes of shares and hypothesize that these firms will 
be less likely to voluntarily implement recommended governance practices.   
 The third influence that we believe may determine a firm’s propensity to 
voluntarily adopt corporate governance practices is the actions of its peers. We 
suggest that if a firm’s peers (i.e. firms within the same industry) adopt strong 
governance standards, the firm may feel pressure to implement these same 
practices in order to compete for capital on level footing.  We test whether this is 
the case by examining whether voluntary adoption varies by industry. To do so, 
we broadly classify firms as belong to one of six industry groups where these 
groups are defined according to the first two digits of the firm’s SIC code.  In 
addition, we control for the firm’s profitability, as measured by return on equity, 
as a proxy for whether the firm is a leader in its industry.   
 
commitment to good governance.  The CCGG indicated that it does perform a monitoring role in Canadian 
corporations. 
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 As a final control we examine whether the firm has shares listed on a US 
exchange. While we restrict our examination of the voluntary adoption of SOX 
and US exchange listing standards to only non cross-listed firms, it is possible 
that the voluntary adoption of Canadian guidelines, in other words the level of 
the BQ index, is in part influenced by whether the firm also lists its shares south 
of the border. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict what the impact of cross-
listing will be on board quality during our sample period.  On the one hand, the 
Canadian guidelines were in place long before the US mandated additional 
governance standards under SOX with US corporate law existing at the state 
level.  It could therefore be argued that although these guidelines were not 
mandatory, their mere presence indicated a more comprehensive governance 
regime than what was in place in the US at the time. On the other hand, the 
implementation of SOX near the end of our sample time period ensures that the 
US standards were more stringent than the corresponding Canadian guidelines. 
As a result, we may expect these mandated requirements to be more effective 
than the voluntary guidelines. For now, we make no clear prediction of the 
relation between board quality and cross-listing. 
 We have outlined firm characteristics that may influence a company’s 
propensity to voluntarily adopt corporate governance guidelines related to board 
quality. Table 2 summarizes these factors and our predictions for their influence 
on a firm’s willingness to voluntarily adopt governance standards.   Panel B of 
Table 1 provides some initial evidence of the influence of block holdings and 
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share listings by reporting average BQ index values for cross-listed firms versus 
non cross-listed, firms with dual classes of stock versus those without, and firms 
with family, executive, or other block shareholdings. Univariate results 
presented in the table suggest that non cross-listed stocks and those with dual 
class shares score lower on the board quality index measure. The same can be 
said for firms with significant executive block holdings. However, firms with 
family blocks or other block-holdings (typically institutional investors) do not 
exhibit this phenomenon. We turn now to a more detailed multivariate analysis 
to establish how these control variables influence the adoption of governance 
mechanisms for firms with varying needs for capital. 
 
IV. Results of Multivariate Tests 
Our empirical results are divided into two parts.  The first relates to the 
behaviour of Canadian firms under a best practices governance regime. The 
second relates to the governance choices of non cross-listed firms that are not 
legally obliged to adhere to SOX or American listing requirements but 
nevertheless have chosen to do so. 
A) The BQ Index
Table 3 examines whether the level of voluntary adoption of Canadian 
governance guidelines referring to board quality is related to both our control 
variables and measurements proxying for the firm’s need for capital. The first 
column of the table examines whether an increased awareness of corporate 
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governance issues since the introduction of the TSX guidelines in the mid-1990s 
has provided firms with greater incentives to implement the recommended 
board practices even in the absence of any formal requirement to do so. In other 
words we are interested in whether the YR variable which is equal to 0 in 1999, 1 
in 2000 and so on is positively related to voluntary adoption.  Given the general 
trend observed in both Table 1 and Figure 1, it is not surprising that the YR 
variable is highly significant with a t-stat of 8.28. As a robustness check, we 
examine whether the increasing implementation of these practices over time is 
driven by cross-listed firms preparing to conform with the regulatory 
requirements of SOX which in part overlap with the Canadian guidelines. We 
confirm that this is not the case by repeating the same regression with only the 
sub-sample of non cross-listed firms (reported in Table 5). Again, the coefficient 
on the YR variable is positive and highly significant, indicating increasing 
adoption of these practices over time. 
 The second column of Table 3 examines whether the control variables 
related to shareholdings and share structure influence the level of voluntary 
adoption reflected in the BQ index. Table 1 provided some initial evidence of this 
influence by reporting average index values for cross-listed firms versus non 
cross-listed, firms with dual classes of stock versus those without, and firms with 
family, executive, or other block shareholdings. The univariate results suggested 
that non cross-listed stocks, those with dual class shares, and those with large 
executive block holdings score lower on the board quality index measure.  
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 A more robust examination of the factors influencing board quality 
requires a multivariate regression simultaneously controlling for all aspects of 
shareholdings and share structure. In addition, in Model 1, we include the YR 
variable to control for the observed general trends in the data. Robust standard 
errors are provided to account for correlation between firm-year observations 
from the same firm. Results are presented in the second column of Table 3. 
 The results show the continued robustness of the YR variable. Despite the 
inclusion of the shareholding variables in Model 2, evidence of an increasing 
trend remains. More recent years show higher levels of governance adoption. In 
addition to time, the most significant (negative) influence on board composition 
is whether the firm’s executive holds more than 10% of voting power. While 
share ownership by executives is often advocated as a way to align the interests 
of managers and owners, we see little evidence that it encourages the adoption of 
good corporate governance practices related to board composition. Firms with 
executive block holdings score significantly worse on the board quality index. 
 We examine the correlation among our variables of shareholdings and 
share structure to establish if multicolinearity is a possible concern. More 
specifically, we are interested in whether firms with executive block holdings 
have other characteristics in common such as the presence of dual classes of 
shares. We find low correlation (less than ±0.17) among executive blocks and all 
other characteristics. In fact, correlation is very low across all variables with the 
only relation of note being the tendency for firms with family block holdings to 
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maintain dual classes of shares (correlation of 0.37). This is not surprising given 
that many founding families hold a different class of shares from outside 
investors. As a robustness check, we repeat the regression excluding the family 
block variable. We find the results are largely the same. The fiscal year and 
presence of executive blocks influence the board quality index while cross-listed 
securities, dual class shares, and the presence of non-family, non-executive block 
holdings do not. 
 With controls for year and shareholdings in place, we turn in Model 3, to 
examine whether the company’s need for capital and its ability to access that 
capital influence the quality of its board. Need for capital is measured by the 
firm’s current capital expenditures, research and development spending and 
level of retained earnings. All three measures are scaled by total assets. Access to 
capital is measured by the firm’s current leverage ratio as measured by debt to 
assets, the tangibility of its assets as measured by the proportion of property, 
plant and equipment over total assets, the market to book ratio, and finally firm 
size (ln of total assets). The values for these variables are downloaded from the 
Canadian Compustat Database. Unfortunately, this database does not include all 
of the firms in our sample nor is data always complete for the firms it does cover. 
In particular the amount of spending on research and development is missing for 
a large portion of the sample. As a result, we drop this variable from the analysis. 
 The third column of Table 3 examines whether a firm with a significant 
need for capital or a reduced ability to access capital adopts board practices that 
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may be viewed favorably by investors. There is evidence that firms with little 
need for additional capital have little incentive to voluntarily improve their 
board structure. The estimated coefficient on the retained earnings to assets ratio 
is negative and significant at the five percent level. Also significant are the 
coefficients on the market to book ratio and asset tangibility measure. In the case 
of market to book, the estimated coefficient is positive indicating that firms with 
a high market to book ratio tend to have better quality boards.  Contrary to our 
expectation, firms with more tangible assets also have better quality boards. 
While we had expected that these firms would rely more on debt than equity and 
therefore face fewer incentives to voluntarily adopt additional governance 
mechanisms, we find that this is not the case.   
 The key variables from the previous specifications of the model remain 
significant with the addition of the Compustat variables. In other words, the YR 
variable and executive block holding dummy remain highly significant. 
 As a final control we introduce a set of industry dummies to the 
regression to establish if firms face competitive pressure to adopt additional 
governance standards within certain industries. Six industry classifications based 
on the SIC codes of the firms in our sample are constructed. These industry 
groupings are mining and minerals, manufacturing, transportation and utilities, 
retail, financial, and the service sector. We first report average values for the 
board quality index across these industry groupings and conduct t-tests to 
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establish whether any one group has a significantly different level of voluntary 
adoption than the rest of the sample. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 4.  
 We find little evidence of significantly different governance standards 
across the industry groups. The exception to this statement is the financial 
industry group which tends to have a lower level of voluntary adoption than 
firms from all other industries. Panel B of Table 4 examines whether this finding 
holds after controlling for other firm characteristics that we have seen to be 
associated with varying levels of board quality. For instance, if financial firms 
also have high levels of retained earnings, they may have fewer incentives to 
voluntarily adopt governance standards not so much because of industrial 
pressures but rather because of firm characteristics. In Panel B, we control for our 
same shareholding variables and those associated with the demand for and 
access to  capital. In addition, we include a measure of the firm’s general 
profitability (return on equity) and dummy variables for industry groupings. We 
use the mineral group as our base industry and provide dummies for firms in the 
manufacturing, transportation, retail, financial and service industries. 
 After controlling for shareholdings and capital access/demand we find 
that industrial pressures appear to have little impact on firms’ incentives to 
adopt the suggested Canadian governance standards. None of the dummy 
variables are significant. Controlling for industry however does alter the 
significance of some of the other factors. While the estimated coefficient for the 
market to book ratio and proportion of tangible assets remain positive, they are 
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no longer significant. Executive block holdings, fiscal year, and level of retained 
earnings however remain important factors in determining the extent to which a 
firm voluntarily adopts the Canadian guidelines even with the addition of 
industry controls. 
A) The SX Index
We proceed to establish whether the same firm characteristics that are 
associated with voluntary adoption of the Canadian guidelines are also 
correlated with the adoption of SOX and listing standards for non cross-listed 
firms. The results are presented in Table 5. To conserve space, we report only the 
estimated coefficients and their significance level. Model 1 includes only the Yr 
variable to establish the influence of time on index levels. Model 2 includes the 
shareholding variables, Model 3 adds the capital access factors and Model 4 
includes the industry dummies. Again robust standard errors are used in all 
model specifications.  Note that because results are based only on non cross-
listed corporations, the number of firm-year observations declines significantly. 
 Table 5 shows that many of the same factors that influenced firms to adopt 
the Canadian standards also influence non cross-listed firms to adopt 
components of the SX index. Starting with the first column we note that the year 
of the observation again plays a large role with firms adopting additional 
governance standards in recent years. Regardless of model specification, year is 
always positively related to the SX index level. When shareholding 
characteristics are added to the model in the second column of the table we again 
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see that firms with executive block holdings tend to have lower levels of the SX 
index. While the estimated coefficient on the executive block holding dummy is 
significant at the five percent level in Model 2, it falls to only 10% significance in 
the third and fourth models. Interestingly, the “other” block holding dummy, 
associated with holdings by institutional investors, enters the model significantly 
in Model 3 with the hypothesized positive sign. This indicates that the presence 
of institutional investors, perhaps some of whom are US-based, may influence 
firms to adopt SOX standards.  However, this result in not robust to the inclusion 
of industry controls. 
 The addition of variables proxying for a firm’s ability to access capital 
markets and its need for capital again show the importance of a company’s 
retained earnings in supporting its investments. Retained earnings are negatively 
correlated with the SX index suggesting that in cases where the firm has high 
retained earnings, it is less likely to voluntarily adopt additional governance 
standards. The level of capital expenditures is again positively associated with 
higher levels of the index with 10 percent significance in Model 3 and 5 percent 
significance in Model 4. As in the case of the Canadian guidelines, Model 4 
demonstrates that a firm’s willingness to adopt SOX guidelines is not 
significantly influenced by competitive pressures such as common industry 
practice. 
 While many of the firm characteristics act similarly in both of our 
experimental settings – Canadian guidelines and adoption of SOX by non cross-
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listed firms – we note one interesting difference. Firm size had no significant 
influence on a company’s willingness to adopt the Canadian standards.  
However, it is positively and significantly related to the adoption of SOX 
requirements. We hypothesize that this may be the case since larger Canadian 
firms will be more likely to cross-list their shares in upcoming years. As a result, 
they may begin implementing SOX standards in preparation for future cross-
listings. While further examination of this theory is beyond the scope of this 
paper we note that the average size of our cross-listed firms is almost four times 
that of the non cross-listed sample. 
 
V. Conclusion   
 In this study, we examined two issues: the behavior of Canadian 
companies under the domestic best practices regime and the impact of US 
governance requirements on Canadian firms that are not listed on US stock 
exchanges.  In both instances, there is no requirement for firms to adopt 
suggested governance guidelines and yet we have found significant evidence 
that they do so voluntarily. In addition, the extent to which voluntary 
governance guidelines are implemented has increased considerably in recent 
years. 
 Drawing on a simple principal-agent model we hypothesize that firms 
will be particularly motivated to adopt additional governance mechanisms when 
their need for capital is high. We argue that capital is a global resource and that 
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as a result, firms may seek to adopt foreign governance guidelines in addition to 
domestic standards in the hope of attracting capital from investors at home and 
abroad. We test this hypothesis by hand-collecting governance data for Canadian 
firms and measuring the extent to which they voluntarily adopt both Canadian 
and American guidelines. 
 Our empirical results show that the adoption of both domestic and foreign 
governance standards is inversely related to the internal capital of the firm (as 
proxied by retained earnings). Firms are less likely to adopt strong governance 
mechanisms if they have sufficient capital on hand to fund their investments. 
This result is robust to the addition of a variety of controls (such as industry 
dummies and the presence of block holdings) which may reasonably be expected 
to influence the firm’s choice of governance. 
 While this paper has provided preliminary results on firm motivation to 
adopt good governance, much remains to be done. Future versions will provide 
robustness tests involving alternative measures of the firm’s need for capital and 
control for possible sample biases during the period of analysis. In addition, we 
will investigate whether more direct evidence relating governance to the demand 
for external capital can be found by examining the frequency with which our 
sample firms access public markets. We hypothesize that firms with a frequent 
need for external capital will be highly motivated to adopt strong corporate 
governance practices in order to appear attractive to potential investors. 
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Table 1: Summary of Board Quality Index (BQ) 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the level of the 
index of board quality (BQ) which is designed to reflect the extent to which 
recommended Canadian governance practices are adopted. This index may 
range from 0 to 4 with a point added for each of the following board qualities: 
separation of the CEO and board chair, fully independent audit committee, 
majority of independent directors, and a provision for training new members. T-
statistics and (p-values) are provided to indicate whether the level of BQ is equal 
to zero and whether its level varies significantly across firms with various 
characteristics, specifically whether the firm is cross-listed or not, whether it has 
dual classes of shares, family block holdings, executive block holdings, or an 
alternative block holder. 
 
Panel A: Mean Values of BQ Index by Year 
Mean Value of BQ Univariate T-test Results 
Fiscal Year  Test BQ = 0 
1999 2.78 38.04 
(0.00) 
2000 2.80 37.28 
(0.00) 
2001 2.96 43.84 
(0.00) 
2002 3.26 54.16 
(0.00) 
2003 3.43 55.74 
(0.00) 
Average Across all Years 3.04 96.43 
(0.00) 
Panel B: Mean Values of BQ Index by Characteristic 
Mean Value of BQ Test BQnon-cross = BQcross 
Non Cross-Listed Firms 2.98 -2.32 
Cross-Listed Firms 3.12 (0.02) 
Test BQnon-dual= BQdual 
Non-Dual Class Shares 3.09 2.90 
Dual Class Shares 2.89 (0.00) 
Test BQnon-family = BQfamily 
Non- Family Block Firms 3.04 -0.86 
Family Block 3.11 (0.39) 
Test BQnon-exec  = BQexec 
Non-Executive Block Firms 3.15 6.52 
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Executive Block 2.60 (0.00) 
Test BQnon-block = BQblock 
Non-Other Block Firms 3.02 -0.66 
Other Block Firms 3.04 (0.51) 
Table 2: Summary of Hypothesize Coefficients 
 
Table 2 identifies the firm characteristics which are hypothesized to influence the 
voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices. Characteristics reflect the 
firm’s need for and access to capital, its shareholdings, and its profitability. The 
hypothesized relation between each factor and the level of voluntary adoption is 
provided. A negative relation implies that the firm characteristic is less likely to 
be associated with a high level of voluntary adoption. 
 
Firm Characteristic Hypothesized Relation 
to Voluntary Adoption 
Need for and Access to 
Capital 
 
Capital Expenditures Positive 
Retained Earnings Negative 
Total Leverage Negative 
Tangibility Negative 
Market to Book Ratio Uncertain 
Total Assets Uncertain 
Shareholdings  
Family Block Negative 
Executive Block Negative 
Other Block Positive 
Dual Class Shares Negative 
Cross-listed in the US Uncertain 
Profitability  
Return on Equity Negative 
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Table 3:  Characteristics Influencing Board Quality 
 
Table 3 provides regression results where the level of the board quality index is 
the dependent variable. This index may range from 0 to 4 with a point added for 
each of the following board qualities: separation of the CEO and board chair, 
fully independent audit committee, majority of independent directors, and a 
provision for training new members. Model 1 controls only for the year of 
observation with the YR variable equal to 0 in 1999, 1 in 2000 etc. Model 2 adds 
dummy variables identifying stock and block holding characteristics, and Model 
3 includes variables measuring the need for and access to capital. Regressions are 
run with robust standard errors to account for the presence of multiple firm-year 
observations from the same firm.  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat 
Constant 2.69 37.49** 2.84 27.83** 2.69 10.40** 
YR 0.17 8.28** 0.17 8.11* 0.16 4.92** 
Cross-listed   0.05 0.51 -0.09 -0.82 
Dual Class   -0.15 -1.35 -0.23 -1.63 
Family Block   0.01 0.11 0.01 0.06 
Exec. Block   -0.52 -4.33** -0.44 -3.18** 
Other Block   0.24e-2 0.03 0.03 0.29 
Leverage     -0.04 -0.12 
Mkt to Book     0.11e-2 2.26* 
Tangibility     0.30 2.19* 
Ln Assets     0.80e-2 0.28 
Capex     -0.09 -0.11 
Retain. Earn.     -0.10 -2.39* 
Observations 894  863  547  
R squared 0.06  0.13  0.15  
* Indicates significance at the 5% level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 4: Competitive Pressures and Board Quality 
 
Panel A of Table 4 provides univariate tests for differences in the level of the 
board quality index for firms from particular industries versus the remaining 
sample. This index may range from 0 to 4 with a point added for each of the 
following board qualities: separation of the CEO and board chair, fully 
independent audit committee, majority of independent directors, and a provision 
for training new members. A positive T-statistic indicates that the remaining 
sample maintains a higher level of the BQ index than firms from a particular 
industry. Panel B of the table (see next page) provides the results of a regression 
in which the level of the index is the dependent variable. Controls for the year, 
shareholding characteristics, variables measuring access to capital, and industry 
characteristics act as independent variables. Robust standard errors are used to 
account for the presence of multiple observations from the same firm.  
 
Panel A: Univariate Tests 
Mean BQ 
Index 
T-test  that BQOther 
= BQInd 
Mineral 3.14 -1.44 
Manufacturing 3.07 -0.84 
Transportation 3.13 -1.00 
Retail 3.13 -0.86 
Finance 2.80 2.40* 
Service 3.04 -0.03 
All Firms 3.04  
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Table 4 Continued: Competitive Pressures and Board Quality 
Panel B: Multivariate Regression 
Coefficient T-Stat 
Constant 2.47 8.04** 
Year 0.16 4.86** 
Dual Class Shares -0.21 -1.52 
Family Block -0.08 -0.43 
Exec Block -0.45 -3.19** 
Other Block 0.01 0.13 
Leverage -0.09 -0.22 
Mkt to Book 0.02 1.76 
Tangibility 0.26 1.51 
Ln Assets 0.03 1.03 
Capex -0.07 -0.08 
Retained Earnings -0.11 -2.69** 
ROE 0.02 1.70 
Manufacturing 0.09 0.50 
Transportation 0.02 0.08 
Retail 0.16 0.68 
Financial -0.26 -1.00 
Service 0.01 0.05 
Observations 547  
R squared 0.16  
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Table 5: Characteristics Influencing Adoption of SOX and US Listing 
Standards 
 
Table 5 reports the results of a regression with an index identifying the voluntary 
adoption of SOX and US listing standards being the dependent variable. The 
index ranges from 0 to 8 with firms receiving a point for each of the following 
terms they adopt: a financial expert on the audit committee, the ability of the 
board to hire advisors, an independent audit committee, an independent 
compensation committee, a code of ethics, financial certification, the elimination 
of internal loans to managers, and a majority of independent directors. 
Independent variables include the year, stockholding characteristics, variables 
proxying for need for and access to capital, and industry. Robust standard errors 
are used to control for the presence of multiple observations from the same firm. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 3.69** 3.84** 2.19** 1.63* 
YR 0.34** 0.35** 0.43** 0.43** 
Dual Class  -0.03 -0.05 0.05 
Family Block  -0.42 -0.42 -0.61 
Exec. Block  -0.56* -0.49 -0.54 
Other Block  0.14 0.52* 0.31 
Leverage   -0.81 -0.31 
Mkt to Book   -0.12e-2 0.03 
Tangibility   -0.98 -0.12 
Ln Assets   0.24* 0.24* 
Capex   2.59 3.28* 
Retain. Earn.   -0.67** -0.66** 
ROE    0.03 
Manufacturing    0.34 
Transportation    -0.61 
Retail    0.52 
Financial    0.11 
Services    0.95 
Observations 322 316 186 186 
R squared 0.10 0.15 0.29 0.35 
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Figure 1: The Four Components of the Index of Board Quality 
 
Figure 1 plots the proportion of firms adopting a particular recommendation of 
the TSX standards related to board quality in each year of the sample. 
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Figure 2: Index of SOX Adoption 
 
Figure 2 plots the number of firm-year observations corresponding to various 
levels of the index of SOX adoption. The index ranges from 0 to 8 with a firm 
receiving a point for each of the following terms they adopt: a financial expert on 
the audit committee, the ability of the board to hire advisors, an independent 
audit committee, an independent compensation committee, a code of ethics, 
financial certification, the elimination of internal loans to managers, and a 
majority of independent directors. Results are provided for the sample as a 
whole and only those firms that are not cross-listed in the US. 
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